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Notes and Comments
Ward v. Rock Against Racism: Reasonable
Regulations and State Sponsored Soundt
I. Introduction
This Note examines the nature and extent of free speech on
publicly owned property in light of a recent controversial deci-
sion by the United States Supreme Court. In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism,' the Court diminished the protection of the
first amendment by relaxing the standards used to judge the
constitutionality of time, place, or manner restrictions2 on pro-
tected speech in a public forum.3 While the majority discusses
the case in terms of whether and to what extent municipalities
may regulate "noise" in a public park, the controversy actually
centers on the proper analysis to be used to determine when
such regulations impermissibly infringe on the constitutional
right of- free speech. "Unfortunately, the majority plays to our
shared impatience with loud noise to obscure the damage that it
does to our First Amendment rights."4
At issue in the case was the constitutionality of regulations
issued by the New York City Department of Parks and Recrea-
tion which vested in city employees exclusive control over the
sound produced by speakers and musicians using public park
t This fledgling attempt at scholarly writing is dedicated to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. His words, the ideals he aspired to, and his ceaseless struggle for individual
rights inspired me to enter law school and kept me there.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
2. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
3. All parties to the case agreed that the area in Central Park involved in the dis-
pute was a traditional public forum. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346,
1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See infra notes 20-38 and accompanying text.
4. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2760 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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land.5 Upholding the regulations as a valid exercise of police
power, the Court expressly repudiated the requirement that mu-
nicipalities which restrict the time, place, or manner of pro-
tected speech in a public forum seek out the least intrusive man-
ner by which to accomplish their goals.6 Moreover, even though
these regulations "gave public officials the power to deny use of
a forum in advance of actual expression,"7 the Court declined to
discuss the obvious prior restraint issue. Such an omission has
broad constitutional significance.
Part II of this Note examines the evolution of the public
forum doctrine and resulting standards of judicial review that
are applied to governmental restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of constitutionally protected free speech. This section
also discusses the doctrine of prior restraint and its application
to the public forum. The facts, procedural history, and underly-
ing reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions are dis-
cussed in Part III, while Part IV examines the implications and
potential repercussions of the decision on first amendment juris-
prudence. This Note concludes, in Part V, that the balance the
Supreme Court has historically attempted to maintain between
the individual's right to free speech and the state's right to pre-
serve and maintain an orderly society has been substantially al-
5. The regulations regarding sound amplification provided as follows:
SOUND AMPLIFICATION
To provide the best sound for all events Department of Parks and Recreation
has leased a sound amplification system designed for the specific demands of the
Central Park Bandshell. To assure appropriate sound quality balance with respect
for nearby residential neighbors and the mayorally decreed quiet zone of Sheep
Meadow, all sponsors may use only the Department of Parks and Recreation
sound system. DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION IS TO BE
THE SOLE AND ONLY PROVIDER OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION, INCLUD-
ING THOUGH NOT LIMITED TO AMPLIFIERS, SPEAKERS, MONITORS,
MICROPHONES, AND PROCESSORS.
Clarity of sound results from a combination of amplification equipment and a
sound technician's familiarity and proficiency with that system. Department of
Parks and Recreation will employ a professional sound technician [who] will be
fully versed in sound bounce patterns, daily air currents, and sound skipping
within the Park. The sound technician must also consider the Bandshell's proxim-
ity to Sheep Meadow, activities at Bethesda Terrace, and the New York City De-
partment of Environmental Protection recommendations.
109 S. Ct. at 2751 n.2.
6. Id. at 2757.
7. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).
(Vol. 10:633
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tered by this decision.
II. Background
A. Permissible Limitations on Free Speech: There Are No
Guarantees
The first amendment to the United States Constitution,
which applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment,8
provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble . . . . " However, in an effort to strike and maintain the
delicate balance between individual rights and state police pow-
ers, these constitutional protections have been limited by the
Supreme Court."° Although the first amendment "rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public,"" the individual's right to free speech
must be balanced against the state's interest in preserving or-
der.'2 Even as early as the beginning of this century, the Su-
preme Court recognized that it is in society's best interest to
prohibit an individual from yelling "fire" in a crowded theater.'
Our society places great importance on freedom of expres-
sion because of the potential for excessive governmental inter-
ference.' 4 Thus, a specialized body of law has developed around
the regulation of speech in public places. 5 While a government
may not flatly prohibit speech in public places, 6 it may regulate
8. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). The terms "abridging" and "free-
dom of speech" require interpretation; limits on expression "for appropriate reasons"
may be permitted. Id.
11. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
12. See generally Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. CT.
REV. 233.
13. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
14. See, e.g., Southeast Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). "[T]he
danger of censorship and of abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms is
too great where officials have unbridled discretion . I..." Id. at 553.
15. For a thorough discussion, see Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
16. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (the
government may not prohibit all communicative activity in places which by tradition or
1990]
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the time, place, or manner of communicative activity to protect
the state's interest in maintaining order. 17 Time, place, or man-
ner restrictions involve government's power to regulate what are
otherwise constitutionally protected activities. For example, a
municipality may
constitutionally regulate the number of residential picketers, the
hours during which a residential picket may take place, or the
noise level of such a picket .... But to say that picketing may be
substantially regulated is not to say that it may be prohibited in
its entirety ....
A valid time, place, or manner law neutrally regulates speech
only to the extent necessary to achieve a substantial governmen-
tal interest, and no further."s
The rationale for this limitation is that "[c]ivil liberties, as guar-
anteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order without which liberty itself
would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." 19
B. The Public Forum Doctrine
The public forum doctrine is of recent constitutional vin-
tage.2 ° Prior to its formulation, municipalities were free to pro-
hibit citizens from using public property for public address in
spite of the express language of the Constitution.2' For example,
in Davis v. Massachusetts,22 the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a city ordinance disallowing any public address
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate).
17. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (a municipality may impose regula-
tions to assure the safety and convenience of people using the public highway).
18. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2507-08 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a
general discussion of time, place, or manner restrictions, see Baker, Unreasoned Reason-
ableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78
Nw. U.L. REV. 937 (1983).
19. Cox, 312 U.S. at 574.
20. See generally Stone, supra note 12.
21. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
22. Davis involved a Boston city ordinance which prohibited public address on pub-
lic property without a permit. Holmes, then Chief Justice for the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, writing for the majority, held that an absolute ban on the use of public
parks for speech purposes would be permissible. 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895). On appeal,
the Supreme Court adopted Holmes' view. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10:633
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on publicly owned property without a permit. The Court likened
the prohibition of speech in a public place to a private person
restricting. speech in his home, and held that such restrictions
were permissible.23
The right of government to regulate the use of public prop-
erty was reexamined by Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO,4 the
decision in which the public forum doctrine was first articu-
lated.2" This case also involved a constitutional challenge to an
ordinance which forbade all public meetings in streets and pub-
lic places.2" Striking down the ordinance, Justice Roberts pro-
vided a foundation which has been used ever since to balance
the rights of individuals against the state's interest in maintain-
ing peace and order. In this memorable and often quoted opin-
ion 27 Justice Roberts said:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has . . .been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privi-
lege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks
for communication of views on national'questions may be regu-
lated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
23. 167 U.S. at 47. The Court borrowed Holmes' language: "[T]o forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringment of the rights of a mem-
ber of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." Id.
(quoting Davis v. Massachusetts, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895)).
24. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (an ordinance forbidding all public meetings in public places
was invalidated). See also Stone, supra note 12, at 238. Professor Stone explains that
Justice Roberts based his decision on the common law property theories of adverse pos-
session and public easements, rather than relying on constitutional principles. Id.
25. The term "public forum" was coined by Kalven, supra note 15.
[I]n an open democratic society, the streets, the parks and other public places
are .. .an important facility for public discussion and political process. They are
in brief a public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empa-
thy with which such facilities are made available is an index of freedom.
Id. at 11-12.
26. Hague, 307 U.S. at 502.
27. This opinion did not command a majority of the Court. Justice Roberts was
joined only by Justice Black; Chief Justice Hughes concurred in part; Justices Stone and
Reed concurred in the result; Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented; and Justices
Frankfurter and Douglas did not participate.
1990]
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convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.2 8
Justice Roberts' recognition of a protected right of free dis-
course on public property has formed the basis of the modern
public forum doctrine. 29 It has also resulted in separate but re-
lated branches of jurisprudence which employ different stan-
dards for judicial review of governmental restrictions of speech
on public property.30
Modern public forum doctrine includes three separate cate-
gories of publicly owned property with different limitations on
the extent to which a state may regulate speech.3 1 Traditional
public property includes public places such as streets,32 side-
walks, 3 and parks.3 " Nontraditional public property includes
public places designated by the government for expressive activ-
ities by the public including libraries35 and government offices.3 ,
Finally, nonpublic property includes government properties such
as military bases37 and jailhouses,3 8 which are not public forums
by tradition or designation. The characterization of a particular
place as a traditional, nontraditional, or nonpublic forum deter-
28. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
29. See Stone, supra note 12, at 239.
30. See infra notes 39-59 and accompanying text.
31. See Stone, supra note 12, at 239-56. Justice Brennan, for one, has argued that
these categories should not be determinative because they "disregard[] the First Amend-
ment's central proscription against censorship . . . in any forum, public or nonpublic."
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 57 (1983) (Brennan, J.
dissenting).
32. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (an ordinance
prohibiting a person from handing out leaflets on a public street without a permit was
invalid).
33. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (an ordinance prohibiting display of
flags or banners on the public sidewalk surrounding the United States Supreme Court
building was unconstitutional).
34. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See generally, Wolin v. Port of New York
Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 940 (1968) (setting forth the
criteria used to determine whether a particular place is a public forum).
35. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (a breach-of-the-peace statute was un-
constitutionally applied to five blacks who engaged in a sit-in to protest a library's segre-
gation policy).
36. See Stone, supra note 12, at 245.
37. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (the government's interest in
assuring the security of military installations permits exclusion of the public).
38. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (the arrest of demonstrators on the
grounds of a county jail was upheld).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss3/4
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mines the standard of judicial review applied by the Court to
regulations affecting speech.
C. Judicial Review of Public Forum Regulations
Generally, while government action which infringes upon
freedom of expression in public forums is limited, 39 government
does have a right to regulate expressive conduct which has a
harmful effect on others.4 A distinction has been drawn between
pure speech, or actual discourse, and symbolic speech which in-
volves the communication of ideas by conduct. "' For first
amendment purposes, "speech" has been broadly defined to in-
clude both political and ideological discourse, 2 and symbolic
speech such as picketing, 43 marching," wearing armbands, 4 and
musical and artistic expression." Excessive noise on public lands
has been held to be the subject of legitimate regulation by
municipalities.
However, depending upon whether the area involved is cate-
gorized as a traditional, nontraditional, or nonpublic forum, the
level of scrutiny applied by a court to determine the constitu-
tionality of restrictive government regulations will differ.45 As
explained in a recent Supreme Court decision:
39. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
40. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984)
(an ordinance prohibiting the-posting of all signs on public property was upheld because
it protected citizens from the "evil of visual blight").
41. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
42. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (an ordinance
prohibiting live entertainment, including nude dancing, was found unconstitutional
under the first amendment).
43. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (an ordinance prohibiting
picketing near a school was unconstitutional).
44. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (an ordinance prohib-
iting parades and demonstrations without a permit was unconstitutional without narrow,
objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority).
45. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (students could not be prohibited from wearing black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War).
46. Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984) (a contract
between a city and concert promoter which allowed the city to cancel any show featuring
"hard rock" because it had the potential for creating a public nuisance violated the first
amendment), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
47. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.
48. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1987).
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In balancing the government's interest in limiting the use of
its property against the interests of those who wish to use the
property for expressive activity . . . proper First Amendment
analysis differs depending on . . . [the] category. In a traditional
public forum or a public forum by government designation, we
have held that First Amendment protections are subject to
heightened scrutiny .... [But] access to a nonpublic forum may
be restricted by government regulation . . . [that] 'is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because officials
oppose the speaker's view.'49
It follows from this analysis that if a court concludes that a par-
ticular place is a public forum, it will apply heightened scrutiny
to government regulations restricting freedom of expression
whether the forum is categorized as traditional or nontradi-
tional." Conversely, if a court decides that a particular place is a
nonpublic forum, it will apply a less stringent standard of re-
view, and will uphold reasonable government regulations. For
example, in Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington),5 an ordi-
nance prohibiting a person from handing out leaflets on a public
street was found to be unconstitutional even though it was the
most effective way for the municipality to prevent littering. The
Court held that the fundamental right of free speech required an
astute examination of the effect of any regulation prohibiting
the right to speak, write, print, or distribute information or
opinion.52 The Court noted that the municipality could lawfully
regulate the conduct of those using the streets by enforcing traf-
fic regulations, or by enacting laws against littering.53 Con-
49. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-
46 (1983).
50. See generally, Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cmi. L. REV. 46 (1987).
Professor Stone analyzes a number of cases involving content-neutral restrictions and
the varying levels of scrutiny actually applied to determine their constitutionality. Id. at
48-54. The Court generally tests content-neutral restrictions using a balancing approach.
"[T]he greater the interference with the marketplace of ideas, the greater the burden on
government to justify the restriction." Id. at 58. However, the Court's analysis is often
ambiguous and result-oriented. "When the challenged restriction has a relatively severe
effect, the Court invokes strict scrutiny. When the challenged restriction has a significant
but not severe effect, the Court employs intermediate scrutiny. And when the restriction
has a relatively modest effect, the Court applies deferential scrutiny." Id.
51. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
52. Id. at 161.
53. Id. at 160-61.
[Vol. 10:633
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versely, in United States v. Albertini," the Court found that the
government's interest in assuring the security of a military in-
stallation permitted exclusion of the public.5
In order for restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
free speech in traditional public forums to be upheld, they must
be content-neutral, 5" narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest, 57 and leave alternative means for communica-
tion of the information. 8 In making this determination, the
"crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basi-
cally incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time.' '
D. Free Speech and Prior Restraint
Prior restraint occurs when an official restriction is imposed
on any form of expression in advance of actual publication."0
Rather than imposing a penalty after the communication takes
place, a system of prior restraint seeks to prevent communica-
tion from occurring at all. 1 It paints with a broad brush, sub-
jecting all expression, the "innocent and borderline as well as
the offensive," to government scrutiny and approval.2
The doctrine of prior restraint has its roots in sixteenth cen-
tury English licensing systems which required that no written
material could be published without prior government ap-
54. 474 U.S. 675 (1985).
55. Id. at 689.
56. Unlike content-based restrictions, which limit communication because of the
message conveyed, content-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to the
content or communicative impact of the message. Stone, supra note 50 at 47-48.
57. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See
also Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988) (a statute is not narrowly tailored when a
less restrictive alternative is available); Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2502, (1988) (a
statute is not narrowly tailored when it targets and eliminates more than the exact
source of evil it seeks to remedy).
58. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. See also
Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988) (an ordinance which prohibited picketing in
front of a particular individual's residence was upheld because it did not prohibit picket-
ing in neighborhoods generally, door-to-door proselytizing and distribution of literature,
or contacting residents by phone or mail).
59. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
60. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648
(1955).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 656.
1990]
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proval1 3 This system expired at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury as the concept of freedom of the press gradually assumed
the status of a common law right. 4 The underlying theory of the
doctrine was well articulated by Blackstone: "The liberty of the
press is essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in free-
dom from censure for criminal matter when published. '6 5
Although the doctrine of prior restraint most clearly applies
to the suppression of written material, 6 it has evolved to encom-
pass the infringement of any first amendment right.6 7 "[Pirior
restraints on speech . . . are the most serious and the least toler-
able infringement on First Amendment rights. '6 Because it is
considered a more drastic infringement on speech than subse-
quent punishment, there is a strong presumption against the
constitutional validity of any prior restraint on expression. 9
Today, the doctrine continues to rest on the theory that
prior restraint is unnecessarily stifling and more restrictive than
subsequent punishment.70 It focuses on the method of the re-
straint instead of the substance of the speech or conduct. 1 For
example, government may impose restrictions relating to ob-
scenity, but it may not do so by screening all books and
63. Id. at 650-52.
64. Id. Emerson maintains that the demise of the licensing system occurred, not
because of opposition to any infringement on freedom of expression, but because the
system had become unwieldy. He quotes Lord "Macaulay: "The Licensing Act [of 1662] is
condemned, not as a thing essentially evil, but on account of the petty grievances
incidental to it." Id. at 651
65. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 814 (1892), quoted in Emerson, supra note 53,
at 651.
66. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (a statute which allowed courts to
enjoin the dissemination of future issues of a newspaper because its past issues had been
found offensive was an unconstitutional prior restraint).
67. State v. I, A Woman Part II, 53 Wis.2d 102, 112-13, 191 N.W.2d 897, 902-03
(1971).
68. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). Justice Brennan recog-
nized that: "[T]he First Amendment . . . accords greater protection against prior re-
straints than it does against subsequent punishment for a particular speech . Id. at
589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). "It is characteristic of
the freedoms of expression in general that they are vulnerable to gravely damaging yet
barely visible encroachments." Id. at 66.
70. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 543 (1977).
71. Id.
[Vol. 10:633
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magazines in advance of their publication.72  To censor
magazines in this way is a prior restraint. "In other words, re-
strictions which could be validly imposed when enforced by sub-
sequent punishment are, nevertheless, forbidden if attempted by
prior restraint. ' 7s This is so because "a free society prefers to
punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. 74
Because of the necessity to regulate in the public interest,
the prior restraint doctrine is less rigorous when applied to first
amendment protections other than pure speech in a public fo-
rum context. 75 Such regulations often take the form of permit or
license requirements mandated by local ordinance. :6 Among the
clearest forms of prior restraint are arbitrarily issued public as-
sembly permits. 77 To prevent officials from having unbridled dis-
cretion over a forum's use, permits or licenses regulating access
to public forums, like parks, must be administered "under pro-
cedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censor-
ship system. ' 78 Such procedures must delineate narrow, objec-
72. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. 58 (holding a system of administrative procedures
resulting in informal censorship violates the constitution).
73. Emerson, supra note 60, at 648.
74. Southeast Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (emphasis in
original) (denial of a municipal facility for the showing of the controversial rock musical
"Hair" because officials felt the provision was not in the best interest of the community
was an unconstitutional prior restraint).
75. Barnett, supra note 70, at 544-45. See also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307 (1967). In Walker, the Court explicitly recognized the heightened protection
given to actual discourse. The Court noted:
We have consistently recognized the strong interest of state and local governments
in regulating the use of their streets and other public places .... 'We emphati-
cally reject the notion ... that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the
same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as
patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments
afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.'
Id. at 315-16 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965)).
76. For a discussion of the deleterious effects of requiring licenses and permits, see
Baker, supra note 18. Professor Baker argues that permit requirements effectively make
spontaneous demonstrations unlawful. Furthermore, they force would-be protesters to
"symbolically bow" to the very authorities they believe are illegitimate. Baker's strongest
criticism, however, is that local authorities often use permit requirements as a tool for
harassment. Id, at 1013-18.
77. Emerson, supra note 60, at 655.
78. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). See also Emerson, supra note 60.
Professor Emerson argues that a system of prior restraint allows government to rule
against free expression "by a simple stroke of the pen." Id. at 657. In addition, prior
11
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tive, and definite standards.79
The burden of proving that the material sought to be re-
strained is not constitutionally protected rests with the censor.8 0
To avoid constitutional infirmity, any restraint prior to judicial
review must be brief and only for the purpose of preserving the
status quo.8 1 Finally, a prompt final judicial determination must
be assured. 2 For example, in Freedman v. Maryland,8 3 a statute
which required submission of all motion pictures for prior ap-
proval was struck down because it did not contain adequate
safeguards to protect against unwarranted censorship. 4 The
statute required those denied exhibition of a film to initiate ju-
dicial action, and to persuade the court that the film was pro-
tected by the first amendment.8 5 Furthermore, the statute pro-
vided no assurance for prompt judicial review, and exhibition
was suspended during this time. 6 Thus, it had a chilling effect
on speech.8 7
III. Ward v. Rock Against Racism
A. The Facts
Ward v. Rock Against Racism arose from a disagreement
between Rock Against Racism (RAR), an unincorporated associ-
ation dedicated to promoting antiracist views, 8 and the City of
New York (City).8 9 RAR had sponsored a political rally/rock
concert at the Naumberg Bandshell (Bandshell) in New York
restraint increases the potential for discrimination and other abuses. According to Pro-
fessor Emerson: "The long history of prior restraint reveals over and over again that the
personal and institutional forces inherent in the system nearly always end in a stupid,
unnecessary, and extreme suppression." Id. at 659.
79. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969). See also
Southeast Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).
80. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
81. Id. at 59.
82. Id.
83. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
84. Id. at 59.
85. Id. at 59-60.
86. Id. at 60.
87. Id. at 61.
88. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 3, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S.
Ct. 2746 (1989) (No. 88-226).
89. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
[Vol. 10:633
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City's Central Park every year since 1979.90 The relationship be-
tween the City and RAR throughout their association can fairly
be described as strained, each accusing the other of irresponsi-
ble, uncooperative behavior."1
RAR commenced litigation against the City after its request
to use the Bandshell for its 1985 rally/concert was denied.92 Af-
ter extensive negotiations, a settlement was reached, and RAR
was issued a permit.93 The following year RAR received formal
guidelines several weeks prior to its rally/concert which outlined
duties and responsibilities of all sponsors of events in the park.
These guidelines covered a wide range of topics including per-
mits, hours and dates of use, insurance, and sound
amplification. 4
90. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2750 (1989). These demonstra-
tions consisted of political speeches and music. Joint Appendix at 14, Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (No. 88-226) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
91. RAR offered testimony indicating it had experienced difficulty almost every
year, either in obtaining a permit for the Bandshell or in completing events without
interference from park officials or police. For example, a witness testified that in 1983
the Parks Department wanted to know the content of their show because it was sched-
uled to take place on Mother's Day. Brief for Respondent at 4-5, Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (No. 88-226) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. In the
same year, police surrounded RAR's sound technician during the performance of a band
whose name expressed antipathy toward police and turned the volume knob down in a
jarring fashion. Police ultimately "pulled the plug" on the event because of excessive
noise although no meters were used to determine the decibel level. Id. at 5. A witness
testified that in 1985 he overheard two police officers ridiculing a Native American folk
singer. Id. at 2 n.2. In the same year, police threatened to pull the plug if the volume was
not turned down even though no complaints were received about the RAR event. Id. at
8. In 1986, RAR was informed by the City that the choice of performers was to be left to
the newly-appointed Program Director for the Parks Department. Id. at 5.
The Deputy Commissioner of Operations for the Department of Parks and Recrea-
tion characterized RAR in a court proceeding as "dishonorable." Joint Appendix, supra
note 90, at 341. He felt that negotiations with the group were difficult and that RAR
violated the terms of their agreements with the City. Id. According to the Deputy Com-
missioner, the event inevitably extended past the time allotted and included vehicles for
which permits were not obtained. Furthermore, summonses issued were never paid. Brief
for Petitioners at 12, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (No. 88-226)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. Volume of sound was an on-going problem. The Dep-
uty Commissioner indicated that the regulations were enacted after the Parks Depart-
ment had received complaints for several years about the level of noise from the con-
certs. Id. at 11.
92. Ward, 658 F. Supp. at 1349.
93. Id.
94. The Guidelines set forth the New York City Department of Parks' policies on
twelve subjects: 1. Permits; 2. Hours and dates of use; 3. Attendance; 4. Sound Amplifi-
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The Sound Amplification Guidelines (Guidelines) formed
the heart of the appeal ultimately heard in the Supreme Court. 5
They provided in relevant part that the Department of Parks
and Recreation would be the "sole and only provider of sound
amplification" equipment and would employ its own profes-
sional sound technician to operate it.98 This city-employed
sound technician was vested with exclusive control over the mix-
ing board which controlled the balance of various sounds pro-
duced on stage, special effects desired by performers, and the
volume of sound. In short, the City's sound technician had ulti-
mate control over the quality as well as the volume of sound
produced at RAR's event.9 '
The City claimed that the regulations were promulgated in
response to complaints by other park users and nearby residents
of excessive noise.9 8 The City also wanted to ensure consistent
quality sound at all Bandshell events.9 9 RAR, citing numerous
past difficulties in obtaining permits and interference by park
officials and police, claimed that the regulations violated their
first amendment right to freedom of expression."' Specifically,
RAR claimed that the regulations gave the City unfettered con-
trol over the sound quality, tone, and mix produced by RAR's
musical guests. RAR claimed that its right to exercise control
cation; 5. Insurance; 6. Vehicles; 7. Concession of Goods; 8. Revenue; 9. Safety; 10. Porta-
ble Toilets; 11. Cleanup; and 12. Evaluation. Brief for Respondent, supra note 91, at 2.
95. See supra note 5.
96. Joint Appendix, supra note 90, at 375-76.
97. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2751 n.1 (1989).
The amplified sound heard at a rock concert consists of two components, vol-
ume and mix. Sound produced by the various instruments and performers on
stage is picked up by microphones and fed into a central mixing board, where it is
combined into one signal and then amplified through speakers to the audience. A
sound technician is at the mixing board to select the appropriate mix, or balance,
of the various sounds produced on stage, and to add other effects as desired by the
performers. In addition to controlling the sound mix, the sound technician also
controls the overall volume of sound reaching the audience. During the course of a
performance, the sound technician is continually manipulating various controls on
the mixing board to provide the desired sound mix and volume. The sound techni-
cian thus plays an important role in determining the quality of the amplified
sound that reaches the audience.
Id.
98. Id. at 2750.
99. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1988).
100. See supra note 91.
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over these factors was essential to artistic expression. 101
B. The District Court Decision
In April 1986, RAR filed an application in the Southern
District of New York for an order to show cause why the Guide-
lines should not be held to violate the first and fourteenth
amendments. 102 The district court ruled that, absent a signifi-
cant government interest, the provisions relating to sound am-
plification were unenforceable, and it granted a preliminary in-
junction.103 The court found that protection of musical
expression under the first amendment extended "not only [to]
the words and songs presented," but also to the sound
"emanat[ing] from the amplification system. 10 4 The court rec-
ognized that music could be "substantially affected by the am-
plification itself and who controls it."'105
In November 1986, RAR filed an amended complaint seek-
ing final declaration that the guidelines were unconstitutional,
and requesting compensatory and punitive damages.10 6 The dis-
101. Brief for Respondent, supra note 91, at 12. See supra note 97 (discussing the
importance of mix and volume to artistic expression).
102. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 636 F. Supp. 178, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The 1986
concert was scheduled for May 4. The Guidelines were issued on March 21, 1986 but not
received by RAR until the end of the month. After receipt, RAR requested the City to
waive the Guidelines for them that year. On April 9, the attorney for RAR was informed
that the Guidelines would be enforced. He subsequently left the state to conduct a trial
in Arizona. RAR filed application to the district court on April 23. The court required
the defendant to respond on May 1 to allow time to confront the constitutional issues.
Oral argument was heard and the decision rendered that same day. In the opinion, Judge
Haight stated that "[tihe timing [did] not permit [for] extended analysis or discussion."
Id. Furthermore, because the record consisted only of opposing affidavits, RAR was enti-
tled only to relief appearing "as a matter of law from the face of the papers." Id.
103. Id. at 179. Specifically, the court found that iequiring RAR to "abandon its
own system, which it used without complaint by the City last year ... [to] use different
equipment whose knobs and dials would be twisted by the hands of strangers[,]"
amounted to prospective constraint. "There is no reason to assume ... [RARI will
[breach the park regulations which limit sound] this year." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). RAR chal-
lenged the constitutionality of seven of the twelve areas addressed by the Guidelines.
The areas challenged were: permits, hours and dates of use, attendance, sound amplifica-
tion, insurance, vehicles, and revenue. Id. at 1350. An additional subject area, distribu-
tion of literature, was removed by the Parks Department after their attorney advised
them that it represented an unconstitutional burden on Bandshell users' first amend-
15
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trict court upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines. °7 The
court acknowledged that RAR had a first amendment right to
use sound equipment capable of producing the quality of sound
it desired at a level "necessary to reach throughout the audience
area."" 8 The court, nonetheless, held that RAR's interest in us-
ing its own equipment and engineer was too attenuated for con-
stitutional protection.0 9
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously
reversed the district court's decision."0 The court concluded
that the City failed to show its regulation did not "unnecessarily
intrude on the right of artistic expression.""' While sustaining
the City's right to limit the volume of performances broadcast
from the Bandshell, the court pointed to less restrictive alterna-
tives which would not penalize those who did not abuse noise
levels." 2 Because the Guidelines were not the least restrictive
ment rights. Id. at 1349 n.3.
107. Id. at 1353. Of the remaining areas challenged, the court ruled that several
were unconstitutional. The fee the City sought to charge for use of its sound system was
found unconstitutional because it exceeded the cost incurred by the City to provide it.
Id. at 1355. The insurance portion of the regulations were held unconstitutional because
it vested unfair discretion in Parks Department administrators. This requirement simply
stated that insurance could be required; it did not state how much, what type, or when it
might be required. Id. at 1356, The attendance limitation of 3,000 spectators impinged
RAR's first amendment rights because it limited RAR's "right to reach willing listeners"
and was not narrowly tailored since larger crowds had attended Bandshell events. Id. at
1358. The prohibition against solicitation of funds violated the first amendment. Id. at
1359.
108. Id. at 1353.
109. Id.
110. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1988).
111. Id. at 371.
112. Id. The court noted that the City had failed to show that the use of a device to
limit sound output was not technologically feasible. Id. Other alternatives included mon-
itoring noise levels and directing sponsors at the control board to adjust the controls. In
the event a sponsor was uncooperative, the City always had the alternative to "pull the
plug." Likewise, city technicians could be allowed to control only excess volume, or in-
stall volume limiting devices and place them in possession or control of city employees.
Id. The district court noted that even when a city employee operated the mixing board
to control volume, another city official had to actually monitor the noise level and in-
struct the technician as necessary to keep the volume within accepted levels. Rock
Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1352. The dissent in the Supreme Court decision noted
that the City had an ordinance restricting noise already on the books, which it chose not
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss3/4
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means of controlling the sound level of public performances, the
court found them constitutionally impermissible."'
D. The Supreme Court Decision
On petition by the City of New York, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to resolve the important First Amendment
issues presented.1 1 4 The Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the court of appeals and held that the Guidelines were a valid
exercise of a municipality's police powers." 5
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court," 6
which held that New York City's Sound Amplification Guide-
lines were valid under the first amendment as a reasonable time,
place, or manner regulation. 1 7 Since the Guidelines were admin-
istered to all users of the Bandshell without regard to the mes-
sage being conveyed, the Court found they were content-neu-
tral. 18 The Court also found that the regulations served the
City's legitimate interest in limiting loud noise in public
places." '9 Moreover, while the Court conceded that the potential
audience for respondent's speech was reduced as a direct result
of the regulation, it found that the avenue of communication al-
lowed was adequate because the regulations did not impose an
outright ban on a manner or type of expression.'20
In its application of that part of the test requiring the gov-
ernment regulation to be narrowly tailored,' 2 ' the Court con-
to enforce. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2762 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). It also pointed out that to control volume at similar events, the National
Park Service monitors sound levels on the perimeter of an event, communicates with
event sponsors, and, if necessary, turns off the power. Id. at 2756 n.5.
113. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d at 372.
114. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2750.
115. Id. at 2760.
116. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia joined in
the majority opinion. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, while Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan, and Stevens dissented.
117. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2760.
118. Id. at 2754.
119. Id. at 2756.
120. Id. at 2760.
121. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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cluded that the City was not required to consider a less intrusive
alternative.1"2 Indeed, the Court declared that a less restrictive
alternative analysis has never been part of the inquiry in these
instances. 2 3 Rather, the Court found that the requirement of
narrow tailoring is satisfied as long as the City's interest would
be "achieved less effectively absent the regulation."'' The ma-
jority opinion also strongly intimated that the courts should de-
fer to a municipality's own reasonable determination as to how
its interests could best be served. 125 The Guidelines were not
substantially broader than necessary, even though the sound
mix was placed entirely in the hands of the City's sound techni-
cian, because the City's sound technician would attempt to ac-
commodate the sponsor's desires. 12 The majority's discussion of
prior restraint, in stark contrast to the extensive analysis of the
dissent, was relegated to a footnote claiming the issue was
inapplicable. 127
2. The Dissent
The dissent agreed with the majority that the regulations
were content-neutral, 12 and served the City's significant interest
in limiting loud noise in public places.'29 They took issue, how-
ever, with the majority's conclusion that the Guidelines were
narrowly tailored and that they left open ample alternative
channels for communication. 30 Joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens, Justice Marshall accused the majority of abandoning
the requirement that time, place, or manner regulations must be
narrowly tailored."3 ' Moreover, Justice Marshall charged that
122. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2757-58.
123. Id. at 2757 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984).
124. Id. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
125. Id. at 2759 ("The Court of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the City's deter-
mination that its interest . . . would be best served . ) Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2756 n.5.
128. Id. at 2760-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2761.
130. Id. at 2761-63.
131. Id. at 2760. Justice Marshall further stated:
Because I conclude that the Guidelines are not narrowly tailored, there is no need
to consider whether there are ample alternative channels for communication. I
note only that the availability of alternative channels of communication outside a
[Vol. 10:633
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the Court allowed government virtual free reign to achieve its
policy ends even so far as to permit a prior restraint.'32
The dissent argued that the majority had taken "language
in a few opinions ...out of context" to support its assertion
that the less restrictive alternative analysis had "clearly" been
rejected. 133 Justice Marshall pointed out that, historically, the
Court's interpretation of the narrowly tailored requirement
mandated an examination of alternative methods of serving the
asserted governmental interest. 34 It also required a determina-
tion as to whether the benefit of the challenged regulation out-
weighed the increased burden it placed on protected speech.' 5
The dissent expressed dismay at the noticeable absence of the
Court's past concern for a balance between the government's in-
terest in regulating conduct and the burden that such regulation
places on protected speech.3 6 Justice Marshall quoted a recent
decision in which the Court found that a narrowly tailored stat-
ute is one which "targets and eliminates no more than the exact
source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy.' 37
The dissent further argued that the majority's instruction to
lower courts to defer to the City's reasonable determination of
how much control is appropriate "robbed" those courts of the
analytical tools necessary to make a proper inquiry. 138 In Justice
Marshall's view, the majority's new standard is apparently satis-
fied if a "regulation advances the government's interest only in
the slightest, for any differential burden on speech that results
public park does not magically validate a government restriction on protected
speech within it. "[Olne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place."
Id. at 2762-63 n.6 (citation omitted) (quoting Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308
U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
132. Id. at 2760.
133. Id. at 2761.
134. Id. See also infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 2765.
136. Id. at 2761-62. Justice Marshall lamented that "after... [the Ward] decision, a
city could claim that bans on handbill distribution or on door-to-door solicitation are the
most effective means of avoiding littering and fraud, or that a ban on loudspeakers and
radios in a public park is the most effective means of avoiding loud noise[ ]" to justify
intrusive regulations. Id. at 2762.
137. Id. at 2761 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2502 (1988)).
138. Id. at 2762.
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does not enter the calculus."' 13 9
While the City promised to "accommodate" the desires of
musicians with regard to mix,14 the dissent pointed out that no
express language in the regulation required it to do so. A pre-
sumption that city officials will act in good faith, absent express
language, is "the very presumption that the doctrine forbidding
unbridled discretion disallows." 4 The dissent found the Guide-
lines constituted a quintessential and unconstitutional prior re-
straint. 42 Whether accomplished by means of "a simple stroke
of the pen," '143 or "by a single turn of a knob,"14 4 exclusive con-
trol over the means of communication gives public officials the
power to censor speech. Ironically, the dissent quoted Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, a member of the majority in Rock Against Ra-
cism, who had written in an earlier case that the first amend-
ment meant little if government "allow[ed] a speaker in a public
hall to express his views while denying him the use of an ampli-
fying system."'45 In the dissent's view, whether a municipality
has the discretion to silence or distort a performer's music, the
result is the same: the municipality censors speech. 146 According
to the dissent, the City's refusal to impose sanctions under an
already existing sound ordinance because "the necessary litiga-
tion [was] too costly and time consuming," underscored its "con-
tempt for the need for judicial review of restrictions on
speech."' 47
139. Id.
140. See supra text accompanying note 126.
141. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2764 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2158). See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying
text.
142. Id. at 2765.
143. Id. at 2763 (quoting Emerson, supra note 53, at 657).
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 493 (1985)) (striking down portions of a statute which effectively limited political
expression).
146. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2763.
147. Id.
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IV. Analysis
A. To Balance or Not to Balance? That Is the Question
The Supreme Court has traditionally been concerned with
balancing the individual's right to free speech against the state's
interest in preserving order.148 The decision in Rock Against Ra-
cism, however, has tipped the scales in government's favor at the
individual's expense. The regulations upheld by the Court in
this case require political speech, consisting of words and music,
to be filtered through the government's sound system before it
reaches the audience. As Judge Dorsey aptly stated, "[t]he mu-
sic goes round and round, but it comes out here."' 49 By taking
control of the sound system, the City actually participates in the
expression.1 50
In upholding the Guidelines as a valid exercise of state po-
lice power, the Court ignored its own mandate that both the op-
eration and effect of restraints on free speech must be subjected
to "close analysis and critical judgment ...."'I Evidently, the
Court is willing to take the risk that the City of New York will
not exercise its option to standardize all expression taking place
within Central Park. This is exactly what the first amendment
seeks to prevent. 52
As a result of this decision, deference will be given to a gov-
ernment determination that time, place, or manner restrictions
are valid. By removing a balancing approach to determine when
these restrictions unnecessarily diminish opportunity for free ex-
pression, first amendment rights are eviscerated. As the dissent
correctly points out, the majority's emphasis on the effectiveness
of government regulations, and de-emphasis of the traditional
balancing approach, would have validated the ban on the distri-
bution of pamphlets in Schneider.53 But the Court did not hesi-
148. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
149. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 636 F. Supp. 178, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (emphasis
in original).
150. Brief for Respondent, supra note 91, at 15.
151. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
152. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945). The purpose of the first
amendment is to "foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public
mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion." Id.
153. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2762. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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tate to find that ordinance unconstitutional even though it pro-
vided the most effective means of preventing littering. Balancing
the interests involved, the Schneider Court concluded that the
City's interest in preventing littering was insufficient to justify
the resulting infringement on free speech. In the words of the
Court, "[a]ny burden imposed on the city ... as an indirect con-
sequence of such distribution results from the constitutional
protection of the freedom of speech .... "I As the Schneider
Court recognized, in a situation where it is difficult to balance
the interests of both individuals and government, the Court
must err on the side of free speech.155 Otherwise, society incurs
the "risk of gradual erosion of the opportunities for effective free
expression.' 156
B. "Roll Over Beethoven" and Justice Roberts; The Public Fo-
rum Doctrine Revisited
The public forum doctrine has been an effective vehicle for
achieving a desirable balance between individual freedom of ex-
pression and government needs. It is disturbing that Rock
Against Racism presages a return to the pre-Hague private
property approach espoused by Justice Holmes.'57 While the ap-
proved regulations do not forbid political discussion per se, they
presume, in essence, that the government, not the speaker,
knows best how to say it. 58
The words of Justice Roberts bear repeating: "The privilege
of a citizen . . . to use ... parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; ...
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or de-
nied." 59 Without expressly overruling Hague, the majority has
ignored its language. The Court's reasoning does little to clarify
154. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
155. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CM. L. REv. 46, 79 (1987).
156. Id. at 80.
157. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
158. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina, 108 S. Ct. 2667, 2674
(1988) (the solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech; and government,
even with the purest motives, may not substitute its judgment regarding how best to
speak).
159. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). See supra notes 24-30 and accom-
panying text.
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the rights of individuals to exercise free speech in traditional
public forums like Central Park.
Arguably, Justice Roberts' distinction between traditional,
nontraditional, and nonpublic forums has been obliterated. The
purpose of these three classifications has been to define the lim-
its of government's ability to regulate constitutionally protected
activities on public property.6 0 The classification of a property
was indicative of the level of scrutiny applied to determine the
constitutionality of restrictions.161 In this case, however, the
Court has virtually eliminated these distinctions for the purpose
of judicial review. While the Court classified Central Park as a
traditional public forum,6 ' its analysis simultaneously stripped
this distinction of any significance. While paying lip-service to
the three categories of public property, the Court has blurred
their respective levels of judicial review to the point of rendering
the doctrine useless.
C. Fine-Tuning the Art of "Linguistic Prestidigitation"
As noted earlier, restrictions on freedom of expression in
traditional public forums have been subjected to heightened
scrutiny. 63 Although the Court confirms that this analysis is still
appropriate, the majority has actually undermined the tradi-
tional method of approach to its application. To validate the
regulation in this case, the Court had to find that the regulation
was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter-
est.6 However, in order to make this finding the Court virtually
redefined the meaning of the term "narrowly tailored" so as to
eliminate the least restrictive means requirement.
In the past, the Court has expressly stated that a statute is
not narrowly tailored when "a less restrictive alternative is read-
ily available."'61 5 It has also said that "[a] statute is narrowly tai-
lored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source
of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy." ' Although this language is
160. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
162. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989).
163. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
165. Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988).
166. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2502 (1988) (citing City Council of Los Ange-
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clear, Justice Kennedy, nevertheless, felt compelled to clarify it.
Referring to the less restrictive alternative requirement, Justice
Kennedy cited Regan v. Time, Inc."e7 to support his proposition
that it "has never been .. . a part of the inquiry into the validity
of a time, place, or manner regulation."1" 8 This language can
hardly be taken as binding, however, as it was extrapolated from
a portion of the Regan plurality opinion which was approved by
only a minority of the Court."6 9
The Court appears to be saying that if time, place, or man-
ner regulations are content-neutral, the Court will apply a rea-
sonable deference standard even in cases involving traditional
public forums. This contravenes the essence of the public forum
doctrine, which mandates that "[i]n a traditional public forum
. . . First Amendment protections are subject to heightened
scrutiny .. .
This "clarification" of the narrowly tailored prong of the
three-part test amounts to no less than what Justice Brennan
has called "linguistic prestidigitation. '1 7' Not content with sim-
ply eliminating the less intrusive alternative as it relates to con-
tent-neutral limitations on free speech in traditional public fo-
rums, the Court proceeds to use a less-effective-governmental-
regulation analysis as a substitute. That is, as long as the City's
interest would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,
there is no need to balance interests or consider less intrusive
les v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984)). A statute which allows the
government to control the quality of sound in order to control the volume is clearly not
narrowly tailored under this definition.
167. 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (holding that a portion of a federal statute which made it a
crime to photograph United States currency absent newsworthiness or educational value
was an invalid content-based time, place or manner regulation).
168. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2749.
169. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court and delivered this part of
the plurality opinion in.which only Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
O'Connor joined.
170. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987) (cit-
ing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)). See
also supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
171. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2150 (1988)
(Through recharacterization, a host of protected activities is "define[d] away." For exam-
ple, "[tihe right to demonstrate becomes the right to demonstrate at noise levels pro-
scribed by law; the right to parade becomes the right to parade anywhere in the city 24
hours a day; and the right to circulate newspapers becomes the right to circulate newspa-
pers by way of newsracks placed on public property.").
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methods. Justice Kennedy's admonition of the lower court's fail-
ure to defer to the municipality's own determination of the
proper extent of its power effectively appoints the fox guardian
of the chicken-coop. 172
D. When Is a Prior Restraint Not a Prior Restraint?
The Supreme Court has apparently forgotten that the doc-
trine of prior restraint does not require a choice between regula-
tion or no regulation, but forbids control that smothers free
communication.1" Rather, the Court has concluded that as long
as a municipality does not forbid expression in a traditional
public forum altogether, it can impose any restrictions it likes. 174
In doing so, the Court has failed to distinguish between govern-
ment's ability to control those who engage in excessive noise,
and government's ability to control every speaker and musician
regardless of whether they have, or will, violate limitations on
noise levels.
The Court says the statute "merely permits the city to regu-
late volume to the extent necessary to avoid excessive noise "175
even though it punishes all park users in advance of their ex-
pression. But, as Schneider teaches, a city's interest in regulat-
ing must be sufficient to justify an infringement on free
speech.1 71 "This constitutional protection [of free speech] does
not deprive a city of all power to prevent littering. There are
obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the
punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets
.. .. 177 Similarly, there are other obvious ways of preventing
excessive noise, such as monitoring noise levels and directing
sponsors at the control board to adjust the controls as the na-
172. In its haste to uphold the regulations, the Court did not even touch on the
crucial issue: the compatability of the expression at issue with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
173. Emerson, supra note 60, at 670. Prophetically, Professor Emerson added that
"systems of prior restraint [are] even more dangerous today in view of the growing pres-
sures for preventive controls over many forms of expression. Thus, the perils that pres-
ently threaten democratic rights in this country confirm the basic soundness of the rule
against prior restraint." Id.
174. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2756 n.5.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
177. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
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tional park system does, or by enforcing the noise restriction or-
dinance already in place.17
8
A prior restraint is an official restriction which subjects all
expression, "the innocent and borderline as well as the offen-
sive," to government scrutiny and approval before it may be
communicated. 79 Rather than punish the few who abuse noise
levels, the Supreme Court would throttle RAR and all others be-
forehand.180 With a "stroke of the pen," the Supreme Court of
the United States has validated a prior restraint on speech. 8 '
V. Conclusion
It has been said "that the [Supreme] Court has the power
and duty to right wrongs ... ."182 Unfortunately, it does not
always do so. In this case, the Court has chosen to eviscerate the
cherished protections that the first amendment extends to free-
dom of expression. Acknowledging at the outset that the case
presented important first amendment issues, the Court pro-
ceeded to trivialize them.' In circumstances which clearly war-
ranted application of the doctrine of prior restraint, the Court
concluded without discussion that it was inapplicable. 8 4 It then
proceeded, in Orwellian style, 85 to redefine the narrowly tailored
requirement, holding that municipalities have never been re-
quired to consider the least intrusive means to implement re-
strictions on the time, place or manner of constitutionally pro-
tected free speech.'
Justifying its decision on the need to effectively regulate
loud noise, the Court condones and encourages government ac-
tion which seriously jeopardizes the most fundamental of our
rights. To anyone who "assume[s] the general principle that,
178. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
179. Emerson, supra note 60, at 656. For a discussion of prior restraint, see supra
notes 60-87 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
181. Emerson, supra note 60, at 657.
182. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT, 192 (1960).
183. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying note 127.
185. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY FOUR (1949). "[Tjhe speaker had switched from
one line to the other actually in mid-sentence, not only without a pause, but without
even breaking the syntax." Id. at 182.
186. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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under the First Amendment and our notions of a democratic so-
ciety, freedom of expression is the rule and constraint the excep-
tion[,]" this decision is particularly disconcerting. 187
Through this decision, the Court encourages "less rather
than more communication of ideas; it leaves out.. . those bolder
individuals who may wish to express their opinions and are will-
ing to take some risk; and it implies a philosophy of willingness
to conform to official opinion and ... timidity in asserting rights
that bodes ill for a spirited and healthy expression of unortho-
dox and unaccepted opinion." 188 One can only hope the Court
does not proceed further down this path.
Kate Mishkin
187. See Emerson, supra note 60, at 655.
188. Id. at 659.
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